In this research, the authors present a modeling framework for balancing resources between customer acquisition efforts and customer retention efforts. The key question that the framework addresses is, "What is the customer profitability maximizing balance?" In addition, they answer questions about how much marketing spending to allocate to customer acquisition and retention and how to distribute those allocations across communication channels. 
M
easuring, managing, and maximizing customer profitability is not an easy task. It requires that in resource allocation decisions, both the benefits and the costs of marketing, sales, and customer interactions are considered. In this research, we conceptualize the marketing resource allocation problem in terms of determining how much to spend on customer acquisition and customer retention and how those expenditures are allocated. Given this conceptualization, the fundamental marketing resource allocation question is, "What is the right balance of resources that optimizes customer profitability?"
Prior research has examined parts of these issues, but to date, there has not been a comprehensive examination of marketing resource allocation that focuses on all three following questions: How much? How? and What is the profitoptimizing balance? For example, Blattberg and Deighton (1996) address the question of how much to spend on customer acquisition and customer retention. However, they stop short of simultaneously considering acquisition and retention spending, which is critical to address the issue of balancing resources.
Using Blattberg and Deighton's (1996) framework, Berger and Nasr-Bechwati (2001) assume a budget amount and then suggest a model to address how that budget should be allocated between acquisition and retention. However, their model is not tested empirically. In contrast, in this research, we propose an integrated approach that sheds statistical insight on this issue and thus goes beyond the deterministic approach that Berger and Nasr-Bechwati provide. Mantrala (2002) points out that Blattberg and Deighton's (1996) approach is only a first step and that there is great scope for more research into customer profitability-based decision modeling of the marketing resource allocation problem. However, this problem is not straightforward, as Hanssens (2003, p. 16) 
highlights:
The more challenging task is to assess long run marketing effectiveness and to allocate the overall marketing budget across the key activities that generate customer equity.... For any given set of business and customer response parameters, there is an optimal level of customer acquisition and retention which translates into optimal acquisition and retention spending levels.
Prior models have begun to investigate these issues. For example, Blattberg, Getz, and Thomas (2001) incorporate acquisition, retention, and cross-buying into a model of customer lifetime value and customer equity but do not identify the specific impact of marketing expenditures on customer profitability. Thomas (2001) examines the link between customer acquisition and customer duration. Reinartz and Kumar (2000, 2003) examine the link between customer duration and customer profitability. Rust, Lemon, and Zeithaml (2004) address both acquisition and retention aspects, but their model does not provide for separate or distinct investments in the acquisition of new customers and the retention of existing customers. Although Rust, Lemon, and Zeithaml's approach enables a trade-off analysis between different aspects of the marketing mix, it does not provide for an understanding of how to trade off specific investments at different points in the customer-firm relationship. Bolton, Lemon, and Verhoef (2004) provide a conceptual model for linking marketing actions and expenditures to customer retention and profitability but do not provide empirical results. Focusing only on existing customers, Venkatesan and Kumar (2004) develop a resource allocation model that provides guidance on how much to invest in distinct communication channels. By estimating the frequency of buying and the change in the contribution margin from one period to the next, they compute and seek to maximize the future value of the firm's existing customer base. In terms of the data similarities and the discussion of spending across communication channels, substantively our research is similar to that of Venkatesan and Kumar. However, our research takes a more longitudinal perspective and examines resource allocations more comprehensively because it begins before the successful acquisition of a customer. We depict a conceptual view of our perspective in Figure 1 .
A natural extension to the contributions made by the previous studies is a conceptual framework and model that can be used to balance resource allocations between customer acquisition and retention and whose objective is to maximize the firm's long-term profitability. It is important that the model be flexible enough to address simultaneously how much and how to invest. This study is that extension. Specifically, Figure 1 conceptually depicts the key processes in the evolution of the customer-firm relationship. In addition, our study presents a comprehensive system of equations that links the acquisition and retention processes to customer profitability and can be used for resource allocation decisions. Because of the linkage, the system can be used to assess the trade-offs that occur in resource allocation decisions. It is important to acknowledge that our approach necessitates that resources can be split between customer acquisition and retention, which is the case in many business-to-business (B-to-B) or direct marketing contexts.
Based on the existing research, our specific objectives in this article are to 1. Present a resource allocation model that addresses the questions of how much to invest in customer relationships and how to invest at different points of the customer-firm relationship; 2. Illustrate the application of the statistical model with an empirical example; and 3. Show by a simulation how varying different inputs to the model (e.g., expenditures, number of communication contacts) affects acquisition rates, retention rates, customer profitability, and the magnitude of the firm's return on investment.
The context in which we address the issue of balancing resource allocations is customer contact strategies. However, the framework that we provide can extend beyond the customer contact strategy. With the rise of the Internet and electronic technology, the question of how firms should interact with their customers is gaining in importance, especially as firms consider the cost differences between traditional communications media, such as television and sales forces, and electronic media, such as the Web and e-mail.
tomer to the firm, expressed in contribution margin terms. Although the term "customer lifetime value" has been used abundantly in that context, we refrain from doing so. Conceptually, there may be reservations about using "customer lifetime value" because it implies complete knowledge (i.e., past and future) about a customer's value to the firm. We do not take such a viewpoint.
that we focus on relate to customer contact channels. The allocation of a budget to customers and across different contact channels is a classic problem that has gained heightened attention in today's multichannel environment. However, typical media planning investigations have been conducted at the firm level (see, e.g., Aaker 1975; Rust 1986 ). According to Tellis (2003, p. 45) , the use of the most disaggregate measure-the individual customer-is probably most appropriate for allocating media expenditures because persuasion is created at the individual level and because media increasingly can be targeted at the individual level. Therefore, an individual-level investigation is a contribution of our study. At the most simple level, different contact channels may have independent effects on a specific dependent variable. Contact channels (e.g., personal selling, telephone, direct mail, e-mail) have been characterized as more or less interpersonal. Personal selling, at one extreme of the communications continuum, is dyadic in nature, offers the ability for message customization, enables rich interaction, and allows for personal relationship building (Moriarty and Spekman 1984; Stewart and Kamins 2002) . Venkatesan and Kumar (2004) find that higher-level bidirectional communication is associated with higher purchase frequencies. Prior research also asserts that if the buying environment can be described as high involvement decision making (such as a B-to-B purchase), a more involving and interpersonal contact channel, such as a personal sales call, will have a much higher conversion rate on average than will a less involving contact channel, such as e-mail or telesales (Anderson and Narus 1999, p. 302) . Therefore, the ability to customize the message easily and build personal bonds with customers will eventually lead to greater retention through personal selling, especially in B-to-B settings. In addition, research has shown that buyers and sellers that have strong personal relationships are more committed to maintaining their relationships than are less socially bonded partners (Mummalaneni and Wilson 1991) .
Extrapolating prior findings to this context suggests that more interpersonal channels will have a greater positive impact on customer acquisition (Mohr and Nevin 1990; Moriarty and Spekman 1984) . Similarly, more interpersonal contact channels will be associated with greater customer retention compared with less interpersonal contact channels. However, there is little theory or rigorous testing to focus our understanding about the efficacy of contact channels with regard to customer profitability. Thus, a unique aspect of this research is that it addresses the issue of the marginal efficiency of contact channels with respect to customer acquisition and two longitudinal performance measures: customer retention and long-term customer profitability.
An important consideration when investigating the impact of communication modes is the potential interaction effect between contact channels. The investigation of interaction effects between different promotional vehicles is complex and rarely addressed by researchers (Sethuraman and Tellis 1991) . According to Farris (2003) , there is a need to develop resource allocation models that reflect media synergies and interactions. For example, Jagpal (1981) studied radio and print advertising for a commercial bank and was the first to present empirical evidence of synergy in multimedia advertising. More recently, Naik and Raman (2003) find empirical evidence for the existence of synergistic effects between television and print media. In a hypothetical scenario, Berger and Nasr-Bechwati (2001) account for the possibility of media interaction effects in their deterministic model of customer equity. Yet so far, no customer profitability approach has modeled empirically the interaction between the marketing-mix variables. In addition, the empirical tests have all been conducted at the aggregate level.
In addition to the marginal effects, this study empirically tests for the synergistic effect of multiple communications media on individual consumers' acquisition, retention, and profitability. Investigating the impact of media interaction on the allocation decision for each of the dimensions is critical because it demonstrates whether it is necessary to change the communications strategy at different stages of the customer life cycle. For example, customer acquisition might be optimized by means of more (highly involving) personal sales calls, but when customers have been acquired, the retention strategy may be most effectively managed by less obtrusive or less interpersonal communication, such as e-mail or Internet-based interactions. The idea that different types of communication channels play varying roles in the acquisition and retention processes has only been discussed conceptually so far (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987) . We investigate this assertion empirically in a B-to-B setting. Thus, the testing of the effect of media synergies on individual customers' behavior is another unique aspect of this research.
Data
Data for the study come from a large, multinational, B-to-B high-tech manufacturer. The company's database includes firms that function in B-to-B and business-to-consumer (Bto-C) markets. The product categories in the database represent different spectra among high-technology products. Even though the products are durable goods, they require constant maintenance and frequent upgrades; this characteristic provides the variance required to model the customer response. The choice of vendors for the products is normally made after much deliberation by the buyer firm. For the product categories, the buyer and seller choose whether to develop their relationships, and there are significant benefits to maintaining a long-standing relationship for both buyers and sellers. 2 The manager here refers to the manager at the firm who supplied the data.
3 A limitation of the data is that we cannot distinguish an interaction between media from a media pulsing strategy. Therefore, we may underestimate the true level of media interactions in the data. 4 In these data, there are no incidences of more than two contact modes used in the same month.
The data used in the study cover a four-year period from the beginning of 1998 to the end of 2001. All of the customers are new to the firms and made their first purchase from the manufacturer in the first quarter of 1998. A total of 12,024 prospects were contacted for potential acquisition, and of those, 2908 made at least one purchase in the first quarter of 1998. The average interpurchase time for an individual customer ranged between 1.5 and 21 months.
To help the manager make an allocation decision, he or she has at his or her disposal information about each prospect before acquisition and each customer after acquisition, as follows 2 : date of each purchase, number of proactive manufacturer-initiated marketing campaigns before that date, type of campaign (face-to-face, telephone, e-mail), and the number of customer-initiated contacts with the supplier firm (through the Web). From this information, we constructed the variables FACE-TO-FACE, TELEPHONE, EMAIL, and WEB to measure the number of contacts that the firm had with the customer through the specific contact mode. In the acquisition equation, the variables represent the total number of preacquisition contacts in each channel before the first purchase. In the duration equation, the variables measure the total number of contacts in each channel after the first purchase. In the profitability equation, the variables are operationalized as every contact (pre-and postacquisition) that the customer has with the firm. If any two modes of contact with a customer or prospect occurred in a given month, we formulated an interaction term between those two contacts. Specifically, we operationalized the interaction terms as the number of times any two communication modes occurred in the same month, 3 which helped us assess whether the use of two different contact modes (e.g., telephone and e-mail) in a given period provides added effectiveness. 4 Additional decision variables under the firm's control are the amount of acquisition dollars spent for each prospect (ACQUISITION DOLLARS) and the amount of retention dollars spent for each customer (RETENTION DOLLARS). These dollar expenditures are allocated to the four different communication channels. Thus, the expenditure amounts cannot change without adjustments in the allocation of effort to the communication channels. In addition to linear terms for the expenditures, we also included quadratic terms for acquisition dollars (ACQUISITION DOLLARS 2 ) and retention dollars (RETENTION DOL-LARS 2 ) in the model. As firms increase their acquisition and retention budget, the associated acquisition rate, retention rate, and customer profitability will be less responsive (concavity). So far, this effect has not been demonstrated in empirical customer lifetime value literature, except for the deterministic (not statistical) approach taken by Blattberg and Deighton (1996) . The quadratic terms do not impose a curvature but help uncover nonlinear effects (e.g., diminishing marginal effects) of the relationship between the expenditure and the dependent variables.
We calculated customer profitability (PROFIT) by subtracting direct (product-related) cost, total retention costs, and acquisition cost from the total revenues the customer generates for the firm during the observation period.
Control Variables
We introduce several covariates to control for exchange and customer characteristics. Exchange characteristics that may have important bearings on the different dependent variables include customer-initiated contacts, the degree of cross-buying, the frequency of transactions (e.g., Reinartz and Kumar 2003) , the customer's share-of-wallet with the focal firm (e.g., Verhoef 2003) , and the relationship duration (Bolton 1998; Bolton and Lemon 1999; Reinartz and Kumar 2000) .
In this context, the firm records the number of customer-initiated contacts that is executed through the Internet. From a utility perspective, customers who have greater expected benefits and utility from an ongoing relationship are more likely to commit to it. Customer-initiated contacts are a way to signal this commitment, and there is ample evidence that frequency of communication is positively associated with a partner's commitment (Anderson and Narus 1990) . We introduce this count measure as a covariate for all three dependent variables.
Cross-buying, which is an indicator of stronger relationships (Kamakura et al. 2003) , should have a potential impact on both relationship duration and customer profitability. We operationalize the variable CROSS-BUY as the number of different categories from which the customer buys.
Frequency of transactions is also a sign of the quality of a relationship (Anderson and Weitz 1992; Kalwani and Narayandas 1995) and therefore should have an impact on both relationship duration and customer profitability. We operationalize the variable FREQUENCY as the number of purchase occasions for each customer.
The firm's share-of-wallet with a particular customer captures the competitive aspect. As a customer allocates relatively more category purchases to a focal vendor, competitors have less access to the customer. Firms that own a greater share-of-wallet of their customers have a strategic advantage over their competitors. A larger share-of-wallet allows for (and requires) greater learning about customer requirements, allows for (and requires) more communication between the parties, and justifies greater relationshipspecific investments (Anderson and Narus 2003) . Thus, a larger share-of-wallet should have an impact on relationship duration and customer profitability. We operationalize the variable SOW as the percentage of the customer's information technology budget that is spent with the focal firm.
Finally, we introduce the LENGTH OF RELATION-SHIP as a covariate for modeling customer profitability. The expectation with respect to relationship duration and customer profitability is that as the length of the customer tenure rises, it allows for more transactions (volume and frequency). If the transactions are profitable, there should be overall greater relationship profitability (Kamakura et al. 2003; Reinartz and Kumar 2000) .
To control for observed heterogeneity across customers, we include additional determinants in the specification. The three available variables represent the following characteristics of the potential targets: type of industry, annual revenues, and number of employees. The variable INDUSTRY TYPE classifies customers as either B-to-B or B-to-C firms. In addition, we use ANNUAL SALES REVENUE ($ millions) and SIZE OF FIRM (number of employees) in this analysis.
Based on these data, the model underlying this research and the potential drivers of acquisition, duration, and customer profits appears in Figure 2 . Figure 2 is a conceptual representation of the three equations that make up our statistical model. In terms of the statistical specification, all three equations are similar with respect to firm (e.g., expenditure amounts, communication channels) and customer (e.g., Web-based communications) action variables. In addition, customer characteristics enter the acquisition equation because the information is available for each prospect. Through the correlation structure, the duration and profit equations also capture the influence of these customer characteristics. Finally, the control variables for customer behavior (e.g., FREQUENCY, SOW, CROSS-BUY) are applicable only to acquired prospects and thus only appear in the duration and profit equations.
Right Censoring
Because of the noncontractual nature of the relationship, customers are subject to silent attrition. Our model includes an estimate of the customers' relationship duration, and we therefore must account for the possibility of right censoring. This possibility was established with the use of Allenby, Leone, and Jen's (1999) approach to compute the expected time until the next purchase. If the expected time until the next purchase exceeds the time elapsed since the last purchase, the account is considered active and the duration is considered right censored. If this is not the case, the relationship is assumed to have been terminated at the last purchase.
We provide descriptive statistics in Table 1 . The unique strength of the data set lies in the availability of individuallevel marketing-mix contacts/communications, costs associated with the channel contacts, and profile data. These data enable us to use individual-level models and derive optimal marketing guidelines for each individual customer or at the segment level.
Research Methodology

Statistical Model
To link customer acquisition, relationship duration, and profitability, we use a system of equations known as a probit two-stage least squares model. We provide mathematical representations of the model in Equations 1, 2, and 3. Percentage right censored ,41
*The data reported refer to the entire pool of acquired and nonacquired people before acquisition. **In the preacquisition sample, these figures only represent acquisition contacts. In the acquired sample, the numbers represent the total number of contacts throughout the customer-firm relationship. does not seem to be part of the system of equations, a selectivity correction term will be specified for the estimation of Equations 1 and 2 to correct for selecy Di = the duration of customer i's relationship with the firm, x Di = a vector of covariates affecting the duration of customer i's relationship with the firm, y Li = the cumulative profitability of customer i, x Li = a vector of covariates affecting customer i's lifetime value, α s , β Ls , β Ds = segment-specific parameters, and µ is , ε Lis , and ε Dis = error terms.
In this recursive simultaneous equation model, a probit model determines the selection or acquisition process, and two distinct regression equations (in this context, they are censored regressions) characterize duration and long-term customer profitability. Logically, the duration and customer profitability are observed only if the customer is acquired. Thus, the duration and profitability equations are conditional regressions determined partly by the acquisition likelihood of a customer. 5 tion bias due to nonacquired prospects. Thereby, Equation 3 will become part of the system. The linkages among the three equations in a probit twostage least squares model are captured by the error structure of the model. Specifically, this model assumes that the error terms (ε Lis , ε Dis , and µ is ) are multivariate normal with a mean vector zero and a covariance matrix as specified in Equation 4 (Lee, Maddala, and Trost 1980; Roberts, Maddala, and Enholm 1978) :
Because of the recursive structure of the system of equations (Equations 1-3), this model can be estimated in stages (Roberts, Maddala, and Enholm 1978) . Amemiya (1974) and Heckman (1976) have established precedence for multistage estimation methods for these types of models. The first step is to estimate the probit model on all the data (i.e., acquired and nonacquired prospects). With the use of the estimated parameters from the probit, a selectivity variable, lambda (λ is ), is constructed for the acquired customers and included as an independent variable in the duration and cumulative profitability equations. In managerial terms, the lambda captures the interaction between customer acquisition and retention and customer acquisition and profitability. Mathematically, the lambda variable is an artifact of the correlation between the error term in the acquisition equation (Equation 3) and each of the errors in the conditional regression equations (Equations 1 and 2). Given this correlation, unbiased parameter estimates are obtainable only by taking conditional expectations of the error terms. The result of this process is the specific functional form of the selectivity variable represented in Equation 5.
We refer to Equation 5 as the inverse mills ratio, where φ(и) is the standard normal density function, and Φ(и) is the cumulative standard normal function. This ratio is a monotonically decreasing function of the probability that a customer is acquired or selected into the sample (Heckman 1979; Roberts, Maddala, and Enholm 1978) . Although this method for estimation and bias correction in selection models has its basis in econometrics literature, similar bias correction approaches have been applied in marketing contexts (Krishnamurthi and Raj 1988; Winer 1983) .
The second step of the process is to estimate the duration model with regressors, including the estimated lambda in Equation 5 and the relevant covariates that affect duration. Estimation in the second step distinguishes between the noncensored and the right-censored observations. It is performed using a standard right-censored Tobit model. With the estimated parameters and the data from the
acquired sample, a forecast is made about the expected relationship duration for each customer. This forecast is used as a covariate in the third step. In the third step, customer profitability is estimated with regressors, such as a vector of exogenous variables that affect the long-term profitability of a customer, the forecasted relationship duration from the second step, and the estimated lambda from Equation 5. The cumulative profitability model specified in Equation 1 is also estimated with a standard right-censored Tobit model.
Covariance Correction
Although it is computationally simpler to estimate it in stages, proper inference requires that the standard errors of the estimates account for the additional sources of variance introduced by using estimated parameters in the second and third steps. Lee, Maddala, and Trost (1980) provide a detailed account of the correct variance-covariance matrix for the parameters of this model. Consistent with their research, we correct the covariances of our estimates to obtain consistent parameter estimates.
Unobserved Heterogeneity
In addition to right censoring, our system of simultaneous equations also accounts for unobserved heterogeneity among customers. In this research, we apply a latent-class segmentation approach (Kamakura and Russell 1989) to account for unobserved heterogeneity at the segment level. There can be a different number of segments for the selection/acquisition process and a different number that best characterizes the duration and/or customer value models. By estimating the model in steps, we allow for this flexibility. Consequently, we can choose the appropriate heterogeneity specification for each step in the model.
Discussion of Results
Model Selection
Consistent with the latent-class segmentation approach, we estimated the model assuming a fixed number of segments. On the basis of changes in model fit statistics (e.g., Akaike information criterion [AIC], Bayesian information criterion), we determined the appropriate model specification. Beginning with the probability of acquisition, we determined that one segment best characterized the data (AIC is .502 for one segment and .508 for two segments). Thus, we argue that the additional sources of variance in the acquisition likelihood that are captured by firmographic variables explain the negligible unobserved heterogeneity. Table 2 shows the likelihoods and AIC statistics for one and two segments.
After assessing the level of unobserved heterogeneity in the preselected sample, we estimated the duration model, followed by the cumulative profitability model. At each phase of the estimation, we considered the possibility that there could be multiple segments in the population. However, the statistics in Table 2 indicate that there is little unobserved heterogeneity. This outcome suggests that the response profiles are likely to be similar for customers who purchase at approximately the same time. We report the results from the model estimation in Table 3 (standardized parameter estimates).
Marginal Effects of Communication Modes
Our model yields largely consistent results regarding the association between the number of contacts through the different contact channels and the three dependent variables (acquisition, duration, and profitability). All communication modes have a positive impact on acquisition, but specifically, our model indicates that face-to-face interactions have the greatest impact (β = .452), followed by telephone (β = .298) and then e-mail (β = .271) contacts. When the question is addressed of which mode of contact is most effective for increasing relationship duration, our results remain unchanged relative to the acquisition model. Our model indicates that face-to-face interactions have the greatest impact (β = .381), followed by telephone (β = .328) and then e-mail (β = .152) contacts.
Finally, with respect to customer profitability, we find that the most interpersonal contact mode (i.e., face-to-face) is the strongest driver (β = .396) of customer profitability, followed by telephone (β = .356) and then e-mail (β = .255) contacts. Thus, the effects are similar to acquisition and duration.
Although contacts through more personalized channels have a stronger association with the three dependent variables in comparison with less personal contact channels, this finding pertains only to the number of contacts through the respective channel. It is also important to note that these modes of contact are distinctive in terms of their costs. The cost aspect is captured through acquisition and retention spending, which we include in the model.
Interactions Between Communication Modes
With regard to contact channel interactions in this research, we find evidence of positive synergies between telephone and e-mail and face-to-face and e-mail with respect to acquisition, relationship duration, and profitability (see Table 3 ). The face-to-face × telephone interaction is not significant in any of the three cases. This finding is important because prior research has found evidence of media synergies only at the aggregate level. To compare the relative effectiveness of acquisition versus retention expenditures, it is not sufficient to consider only the parameter estimates or the marginal effects of the variables, because the way the expenditures are allocated across the communication channels will influence the effectiveness of the expenditures. We therefore make this assessment in the next section by considering simultaneously how much is allocated and how the expenditures are allocated.
Control Variables
The control variables that we introduced in the model are, for the most part, significant at p < .05, and they show no counterintuitive signs. Acquisition expenditures and retention expenditures have diminishing marginal associations with the likelihood of customer acquisition, lifetime duration, and customer profitability. This finding empirically verifies Blattberg and Deighton's (1996) proposition, in which they assert that there are decreasing returns to acquisition and retention expenditures. Thus, there are optimal expenditure levels that result in optimal acquisition and retention rates.
A key aspect of our selection model approach is the ability to assess the impact of the acquisition stage on the later duration and profitability stages. Consistent with prior research (Thomas 2001) , the data reveal that the duration of a relationship is correlated with the likelihood of acquiring a customer (β λ = .299). In addition, we find a marginally significant, positive association of acquisition likelihood and profitability (β λ = .096). This important finding posits that a customer who is more likely to be acquired is also more likely to generate higher returns for the company, which underscores the importance of targeting the correct prospects as opposed to all potential prospects. It also underscores the need to model the constructs in a simultaneous fashion, as is done here. Of the total variance explained across the three equations, the distribution of the relative weights, on average, is approximately 25%, 27%, 23%, and 25% for the acquisition expenditure, retention 
Duration Equation
expenditure, firm-initiated contacts, and remaining control variables, respectively.
Resource Allocation Optimization
According to our analysis of the parameter estimates, there are several key issues that must be explored further:
1. Given budget constraints, how does the profit-maximizing strategy allocate resources between the contact modes that vary in their degree of interpersonal interaction and costs? 2. Which is more critical for profitability, acquisition or retention expenditures? 3. Does the contact strategy that maximizes customer profitability also maximize acquisition or retention rates?
To explore these issues more concretely, we performed several simulations based on the parameter estimates and the equations for acquisition, duration, and customer profitability (i.e., Equations 1-3).
The Profit-Maximizing Resource Allocation Strategy
Maximizing customer profitability for the duration of the customer-firm relationship is the goal of this simulation. In Scenario 1 (see Table 4 ), we determined the levels of acquisition and retention expenditures, the number of contacts in each channel, and the degree to which the channels should be used at the same time to maximize cumulative profits. In our model, the intermediate steps in this profit maximization are the estimation of (1) the λ parameter given the expenditure and contact levels and (2) the relationship duration given the expenditure and contact levels. We assume that all other variables in the model (i.e., share-of-wallet, cross-buying, frequency, and firmographics) are at their mean.
To be consistent with the model variables, it is important for this analysis (and all other scenarios) that the expenditures are directly linked to the number and type of contacts. Thus, in each simulation, the total expenditure (acquisition plus retention) equals the total cost of contacting the customer through the various modes of communication. This necessary condition still allows the allocation across channels to be different for the same levels of expenditure.
As a comparison to Scenario 1, we simulated Scenario 2, in which we maximized customer profitability but allowed the number of contacts in each channel and the degree of simultaneous usage to vary. In Scenario 2, the expenditures and all the other variables are fixed at their means. We present the results for the two scenarios in Table 4 .
Scenario 1 shows that the profit-maximizing strategy for the firm is to invest 78.9% of its budget in retention and 21.1% in acquisition. This allocation is slightly different from the firm's current mean allocation of 74.8% for retention and 25.2% for acquisition (Scenario 2). However, the dramatic difference between the profit-maximizing solution (Scenario 1) and the mean level of spending (Scenario 2) is in the amount spent. Specifically, the analysis shows that, assuming an optimal allocation of contacts across channels in both scenarios, a 68.31% decrease in spending from the mean level increases the cumulative profitability of a customer by 41.52%. Thus, currently the firm is overspending on its customers. This overspending apparently increases the customer acquisition rate (.2234 in Scenario 1 versus .2579 in Scenario 2) and the expected relationship duration (1490 days in Scenario 1 versus 1514 days in Scenario 2). However, the long-term profitability of a customer is declining, which suggests that overspending can result in inefficient resource allocation and, more important, a negative return on investment (ROI). We provide a more detailed discussion of ROI subsequently. From a measurement perspective, this result supports the claim that firms should not use a single measure to assess their performance. Measuring acquisition rates, retention rates, and long-term profitability is important for understanding customer behavior and for accurately identifying potential problems in the firm's customer management practices.
In terms of the effort allocation and number of contacts, the profit-maximizing solution (Scenario 1) suggests that the dominant form of communication should be e-mail (80.4% of the total effort). Telephone communication is the second most impactful contact and should receive 11.0% of the total effort allocation. From the parameter estimates alone, this finding may appear erroneous because e-mail communications are the least effective in terms of acquisition, duration, and profitability. A rationale for this effect may be that budget constraints, a reality for almost all firms, factor into the simulation but are not taken into account when the parameters are determined from the estimation. In the simulation, we allow expenditures and/or the number of contacts to vary within the range of the data used to estimate the model. With budget constraints and in these conditions, cost effectiveness, not just efficiency, must be a consideration and compared across alternatives.
From the cost effectiveness considerations of the e-mail communication channel, an obvious question that arises is, To what extent should e-mail be used in conjunction with other modes of communication? We address this question in our analysis through the interaction terms. The interaction terms measure the number of times that any two communication modes should occur in the same month but do not represent an increase in the total number of communication contacts. Thus, in the optimal scenario, we find that when telephone communications are used, an e-mail should accompany it during that same period on 1.6 occasions. In other words, 37% of the telephone contacts should be accompanied by an e-mail. With regard to face-to-face communication, the optimal scenario is to accompany the faceto-face interaction with an e-mail interaction in the same period 67% of the time.
Although the firm cannot control the degree of customer-initiated interactions, it can create opportunities to encourage such communications, and the Web is a tool for doing that. The simulation suggests that 7.1% of the firm's resources should be directed toward communicating with customers through the Web channel.
As a contrast to the profit-maximizing effort and expenditure allocation (Scenario 3), we also examine the profitmaximizing communication strategy given a mean level of expenditures (Scenario 2). At the mean level of expenditure, which is higher, the profit-maximizing contact strategy is to increase the total number of contacts by nearly 60% (from 40 to 63). The distribution of the contacts is split more evenly, with 50.3% directed toward e-mail communication and 43.9% directed toward telephone communication.
Compared with the e-mail and telephone channels, the emphasis on Web and face-to-face channels is minimal.
Comparing the differences in budget and channel emphasis across Scenarios 1 and 2, we conclude that overspending tends to lead to greater investments in more costly and interpersonal communications that do not pay off in terms of customer profitability. Firms can use this key practical insight when faced with the need for cutbacks on expenditures.
Which Is More Critical: Acquisition Expenditures or Retention Expenditures?
The goal of this analysis is to demonstrate the impact of not optimizing acquisition expenditures versus not optimizing retention expenditures. To demonstrate this impact, we focus on customer profitability. We predict profits using unstandardized estimates and the model represented by Equations 1-3. As in the previous part of the simulation, before predicting profits, we estimate and use the lambda and relationship duration in the profit prediction, and we fix all other necessary but nonrelevant variables at their means.
To mimic the economic environment in which firms reevaluate their budgets, we allow the expenditure change to be either 10% or 25% and be driven by a change in either the acquisition or the retention budgets. In Table 5 , we show how the per-customer profitability changes at different expenditure levels. For reference, in Table 6 we report the total expenditure change as acquisition and retention expen- Tables 5 and 6 , we round all dollar amounts to the nearest whole number and all percentages to two decimal points.
7 As a result of rounding, increasing and decreasing the acquisition budget by 10% appears to give the same result. However, through our analysis, we find that reducing the budget results in profits that are slightly lower than those that result from increasing the acquisition budget by the same amount. The absolute difference between a 10% increase and a 10% decrease is $.42. 8 This number is representative of the size of this firm's customer base. diture deviations from their optimal levels. 6 When interpreting Table 5 , it is important to recall that acquisition and retention expenditures represent different proportions of the total budget (Table 4) . Thus, a 10% deviation in the acquisition budget (which is a significantly smaller portion of the total budget) from its optimal level represents only a 2.11% deviation from the optimal total budget.
The profit projection in Table 5 shows that the percentage changes in profit are small, particularly at the level of a 10% change in the total budget. This projection suggests that relatively substantial deviations from optimal expenditures are associated with relatively modest changes in the dependent variable (i.e., a flat maximum). However, despite the modest percentage changes in profits for a single customer, on an absolute basis and for multiple customers, the loss in profitability is significant. For example, the smallest difference occurs when the acquisition budget is .90 of the optimal and the retention budget is optimal. 7 At this expenditure level, a firm with a portfolio of 200,000 customers 8 will save approximately $2.69 million from reduced marketing expenditures but lose approximately $39.3 million in long-term customer profitability because of suboptimal budget allocations. These figures only become more magnified as the budgets deviate further from the optimal level.
There are several important insights regarding the ROI when budgets deviate from the optimal level. To compute the ROI, we use the approach described by Rust, Lemon, and Zeithaml (2004) , which focuses on the size of the investment and the change in customer equity that results from the investment. In this context, we measure the change in customer equity as the deviation in the long-term profitability from the optimal level. Thus, the change in customer equity and the resultant ROI calculations are negative. We report the exact numbers in Table 7 . The first insight from the ROI analysis pertains to acquisition spending.
Acquisition Spending. Under the assumption that retention spending is optimal and contacts are optimally allocated, the misallocation (i.e., deviation from the optimal acquisition expenditure) is asymmetric; underspending on acquisition is worse than overspending on acquisition by the same amount. For example, overspending the optimal acquisition budget by 25% results in an ROI of -2.83, whereas underspending by 25% results in an ROI of -3.03. A similar insight can be drawn from retention spending.
Retention Spending. Under the assumption that acquisition spending is optimal and contacts are optimally allocated, overspending on retention is better than underspending on retention by the same amount. This result is most significant at the 25% level. At this level, underspending on retention results in an ROI of -55.29, whereas overspending by 25% results in an ROI of only -4.27.
The results on the diagonal of Table 7 also provide insight into the acquisition/retention trade-off. Specifically, the diagonals help answer the following question: When faced with the need to make a budget change, how should firms make that change? In most cases, firms consider this question not as "either/or" but rather as how much to pull from or add to each budget. The diagonals provide insight into this question.
Diagonal 1. Diagonal 1 describes the situation in which neither the acquisition nor the retention budget is at its respective optima, and instead, one type of expenditure is increased while the other is decreased. At comparable absolute total budget changes (see Table 6 ), the results in Table 7 show that increases in acquisition expenditures and decreases in retention expenditures (from the optimal) result in lower ROIs than do decreases in acquisition and increases in retention. This important outcome is not obvious from the parameter estimates because the ROI metric we used in this analysis taps further into a firm's performance than just profitability. Here, the ROI measure focuses on the incremental change in customer value and compares the size of that change for different levels of investment. Thus, consistent with our prior assertion, multiple metrics are useful for assessing firm performance.
Diagonal 2. The highlighted Diagonal 2 provides insight into the impact of jointly increasing or decreasing the acquisition and retention budgets. At comparable absolute changes in the total budget, the results indicate that underspending decreases the ROI more than does overspending. This effect becomes significantly more magnified at greater deviations from the optimal expenditure levels. This result has important implications for customer portfolio management because it suggests that firms must invest sufficiently to acquire and maintain relationships. Although the investment in the customer may become less efficient beyond the optimal expenditure level, the decreased efficiency does not outweigh the lost value that the firm would incur if the customer's potential was not fully realized.
Does the Optimal Contact Strategy Maximize Customer Profits, Acquisition Likelihood, and Relationship Duration?
Intuitively, an optimal strategy should maximize the customer's profitability, the acquisition likelihood, and the relationship duration. However, the relative magnitude of the parameter estimates across the three equations suggests that this is not the case. To investigate this proposition, we vary the number of contacts and the interaction level between the contacts but fix the other variables (including expenditures) at their means. Then, we use the estimates from each equation of the model to determine the number and distribution of contacts that would maximize customer profitability (Scenario 2), the probability of acquisition (Scenario 3), and the length of the customer-firm relationship (Scenario 4). We show this comparison in Table 4 .
In Table 4 , note that the contact strategy, which maximizes customer profitability, results in a .26 probability of acquisition and a relationship duration of 1514 days. In con- trast, the contact strategy that maximizes the acquisition likelihood results in a probability of acquisition of .30. The contact strategy that maximizes relationship duration results in a duration of 1587 days. Thus, the profit-maximizing contact strategy maximizes neither acquisition likelihood nor relationship duration. Because the communication budget is fixed in this scenario, it is appropriate to consider it in terms of maximization, not in terms of optimization. The maximization of acquisition and retention rates results from various channel usage scenarios within the budget restriction.
A reason for this outcome could be that the profit equation parameters reflect the cost effectiveness (i.e., costbenefit) of each contact mode, whereas the acquisition and duration equation parameters reflect only the effectiveness of each contact mode. This distinction leads to a difference in the relative magnitude of the parameters when profit is the response objective versus when acquisition likelihood or relationship duration is the response objective. Therefore, the optimal solution for acquisition or duration will not necessarily be the optimal solution for a profit objective.
Another interesting finding from this analysis pertains to the strategy for allocating resources across the contact channels. Note that in Scenarios 3 and 4, it is not the total number of contacts that is determined but rather the acquisition or retention contacts. Thus, when we compare Scenario 2 with Scenarios 3 or 4, we consider the percentage of either the acquisition or retention effort, not the percentage of total effort.
Comparison of Scenario 2 (maximizing profits) and Scenario 3 (maximizing acquisition rates) reveals a similar but reverse emphasis. In both scenarios, telephone and email are the dominant forms of communications. Specifically, the results suggest that more than 93% of the acquisition effort should be directed toward these two channels. However, when cumulative profits are the objective, telephone is more dominant than e-mail, whereas the reverse is true when acquisition is the objective. In contrast to the acquisition scenario, the comparison between Scenario 2 (maximizing profits) and Scenario 4 (maximizing duration) suggests a similar optimal distribution of communications across the channels. Specifically, the relative ordering of retention communication efforts across the channels is the same for cumulative profit maximization and duration maximization. In combination, Scenarios 2, 3, and 4 suggest that when the goal is short term, such as customer acquisition, interpersonal interactions are not as critical. However, for objectives managed over a longer time horizon (e.g., cumulative profitability), interpersonal interactions aid in the achievement of the objective.
In summary, this simulation addresses three general questions that a practicing manager may confront:
1. If marketing budgets deviate from their optimal level, what is the impact on customer profitability (see Table 5 )? 2. If managers are mandated to cut their budgets by, say, a fixed percentage, from which "bucket" should they make the cuts-acquisition, retention, or both (see Tables 5 and 6 )? 3. Increasingly, marketing managers are assessed on the basis of not only their profits but also their ROI. Thus, under the assumption of a suboptimal allocation of the budget, in 9 We also estimated the model presented in this research on a data set for a B-to-C firm that used similar customer contact modes. Although this empirical context was not as rich, the effects that are of focal interest (decreasing returns to acquisition and retention, flat maximum, asymmetric response to acquisition, and retention spending changes) were consistent with our original findings. which allocation scenario is the ROI more attractive (see Table 7 )?
Conclusion
In this study, we investigated several drivers of customer profitability and derived some implications for resource allocations to customers and prospects. A key assertion demonstrated in this analysis is that both the amount of investment and how it is invested in a customer relate directly to the acquisition, retention, and profitability of that customer. Expanding on this basic principle, we arrive at several substantive conclusions for our empirical setting.
How Much to Invest
We find that underspending is more detrimental and results in smaller ROIs than does overspending. When firms trade off between expenditures for acquisition and those for retention, a suboptimal allocation of retention expenditures will have a greater impact on long-term customer profitability than will suboptimal acquisition expenditures. Consistent with prior research (Chintagunta 1993; Tull et al. 1986 ), there appears to be a flat maximum with respect to acquisition and retention expenditures. Specifically, we find that a 10% deviation in either acquisition or retention expenditures from their respective optimal levels results in less than a 1% change in the long-term profitability of a customer.
How to Invest
If the firm initiates the contact, the relative effectiveness of highly interpersonal and interactive communication channels is greater than that of less interpersonal and interactive communication channels. However, this generalization does not hold for all response variables if the customer initiates the interaction. The customer communications strategy that maximizes long-term customer profitability maximizes neither the acquisition rate nor the relationship duration. Instead, developing a communications strategy to manage long-term customer profitability generally requires a longterm and holistic perspective toward the relationship. This perspective tends to give more emphasis to more interpersonal and interactive communications than does a limited focus on acquisition.
Each of these conclusions can be used for the strategic advantage of a firm and can have a potentially large impact on the cost and/or revenue aspect of customer profitability. We acknowledge that generalizability of some of the results can be achieved only with further testing on multiple data sets. 9 However, many of the conclusions would not have been revealed if our model did not integrate acquisition, retention, and customer profitability into a single framework that accounts for the natural linkages and endogeneity of the relationship dimensions, a critical contribution of our research. Specifically, we present a decision framework for managing multiple dimensions of a customer-firm relationship that is based on established statistical models and econometric methods. In line with much research in customer relationship management, individual customer profitability should be the objective function. A key conclusion of this research is that firms can manage their customer base profitably, but it requires resource allocation decisions that involve trade-offs.
Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research
Despite the usefulness of this decision-modeling framework, we realize that it has certain limitations. For example, a competitor's action may have an impact on the focal firm's customer behavior. However, because we lack more specific data, in this research we account for competition by including only a customer's share-of-wallet with the focal firm.
Another caveat of this research is our ability to separate marketing expenditures between customer acquisition and retention. This separation is more straightforward in a B-to-B context but can become quite complex in B-to-C settings and when mass communications are a major part of the marketing expenditure.
Finally, to arrive at empirical generalizations, additional research should investigate the relationships between the key constructs in other industries and with regard to other resource decisions. The key limiting factor seems to be the availability of appropriate data that enable these kinds of tests. However, this research has taken a first step toward a more complete understanding of the drivers of customer profitability by using a database that tracks information from before acquisition to termination by the customer or to the right-censoring period.
